Some possibilities for Libya, none of which make particularly cheerful reading:
‘End game. What happens after the demise of the regime may be slightly influenced by the manner and speed of the overthrow:
Fight. The core of the regime may fight to the bitter end, most likely in Tripoli or possibly attempting to retreat to Sirte or Sebha. International calls for the departure of Qadhafi, and threats of international action and consequences for further atrocities, may help to split the army away from Qadhafi, accelerating the collapse.
Flight. Qadhafi and his family may try to flee, for example to a neighbouring sub-Saharan country. However, they now have very few options for where they can reach and avoid being brought to justice in due course.
Rapid collapse. A rapid final collapse would cause the least overall damage. This could occur through escalating defections and resignations in the army, and the rapid flight, capture or killing of the Qadhafis and loyalist ‘men of the tent’. This path of events would make for an easier environment for national dialogue among opposition and civic groups and the formation of a caretaker administration.
Prolonged collapse. A drawn out, prolonged collapse would be most damaging, both in the human cost during the collapse, and potentially afterwards. It could comprise prolonged battles or sieges, army splits, massacres and random killings. This path of events would carry a risk of a vengeful and bloody aftermath, perhaps with lynchings of ex-regime members and possibly a retaliatory campaign of sabotage against those trying to establish a new administration. A prolonged collapse would delay the formation of a new administration and cause more disruption to the economy.’